de veritate san tommaso

§ 566. Obviously, circular undulations form in the water where it is hit; and these are small around the point of striking, but with a strong movement; whilst further away the undulations are large and the movement is weak. Thirdly, there are the common sensibles’, found in things some of whose accidental qualities are ‘proper sensibles’. In another way, on the contrary, when the subject of the proposition falls within the definition of the predicate, as when it is said that a nose is snub, or a number is even; for snubness is nothing but a quality of a nose, and evenness of a number which can be halved; and in these cases the subject is a cause of the predicate. And lest anyone should suppose this to be true of any and every intellect, that it is in potency to its objects before it knows them, he adds that he is speaking here of the intellect by which the soul understands and forms opinions. A reinforcement must come therefore [he said] from without; in that other atoms enter by respiration, preventing from dispersal those that are within the animate body, and which simultaneously resist the constraining and compressing environment; and that animals live so long as they can do this. As to (a) he first deals with the elements that refer to the soul’s essence, and then to those that refer to its subject, at ‘Such a body will be organic’, and in the part that concerns the essence he considers first the statement that the soul is an ‘act’, and then, at ‘Now this can mean one of two things’. For knowledge and health are forms or actualities of certain subjects: knowledge is a form of the part of the soul that knows, health of the body capable of health. But seeing involves only a spiritual change-hence its maximum spirituahty; with hearing as the next in this order. And, because to produce sound it is necessary that there be a rebound from a struck thing’s resistance, consequently not everything that strikes or is struck gives out sound (as was said to begin with): e.g. § 328. the diagonal and incommensurability for the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its sides. Some had supposed a sort of medium connecting the two together by a sort of bond. This he says because, while his intention in general is to define the sense-object first, and after that the sense itself, in the case of touch he is going first to enquire into the sense; and this because the questions he wants to answer are more conveniently dealt with in this way than by treating first of the tangible object. ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY Hence, too, the tongue is necessary that one animal may communicate, by sound, its feelings to another. He says this against Plato in particular, who maintained that desire and sensation had distinct organs in different parts of the body. Hence whatever makes the organ to be such as itselfis actually, does so, the organ being in potency thereto. § 435. It would seem not indeed. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate Fratruma praedicatorum. § 847. Let each know its like, it will not know bone or man unless these be in it. What has been said already is enough to show that Empedocles’s theory is highly questionable and his manner of expressing it slipshod. Yet though a mind is already, in a way, in act when it has intelligible notions in the manner of one who possesses a science habitually, none the less the mind then is still, in a way, in potency; though not in the same way as it was before it acquired the science, either by being taught it or by its own unaided efforts. Next, at ‘The primary sensitive part’, he concludes about the organ of sense. prompted to act, ‘in the present moment’, i.e. But clearly,the intellect cannot be any one of the exterior senses already considered; for its apprehension is not restricted to any one particular class of sense-objects. But experience proves that certain living things have parts with several activities each, and a soul that is identical in kind in the whole and in all the parts; e.g. Or in several? So matter is included when he says ‘in these’. For the elements of these are not interrelated at random, but by some ratio or principle of composition, as Empedocles said of bone, Editori di San Tommaso, 1970 and 1975. Last and least extensive of all [the species] that reasons and understands (as man and any other such). § 189. by a remote potentiality. § 292.What imagination has to do with desire and sensitivity will be shown later. § 352-4 For they suppose that like is known by like, as if they meant to identify things themselves with the soul. De veritate - Upper cover (IB3480a).jpg 988x1.536; 171 KB Doodskist van Thomas van Aquino wordt naar de Dominicaanse kerk van Toulouse gebracht Het leven van de heilige Thomas van Aquino (serietitel), RP-P-1878-A-1869X.jpg 4.566x6.430; 6,19 MB That is why sensation will not occur without an exterior sense-object, just as combustible material does not burn of itself, but needs to be set on fire by an exterior agent; whereas if it were actually fire it would burn simply by itself. And the same argument holds of other beings that it is impossible that anything whatever might be affected by sense-objects; this can only happen in things endowed with sense. In this way a sound is actual when it is heard. All these statements can also be divisions. It seems, therefore, to feed and grow because it so obviously seizes and subdues to itself other things. §§ 439-41, Sound in act is always of something, on something, in something: for it is caused by percussion. It has certainty; for everyone knows by experience that he has a soul which is his life-principle. The specific nature is individualised through matter; hence the individualising principles and individual accidents are not included in the essence as such. § 562, What then is to smell, save to be ‘affected somehow’? And the sun is, of course, strongest in the daytime while it is visible and is moving across the upper hemisphere; hence the name of ‘day planet’ given it by astronomers. Food is changed into the being of the one fed; hence all contraries which alternate in a subject without the one ever actually changing into the other have nothing to do with food. For taste is a kind of touch, discriminating, as it does, between the goodness or harmfulness of different foods. For all things are either elements or are made of one, or of several, or of all. Omnino autem neque tempore. § 645, Again, we do not say, when we are functioning accurately with regard to sense-objects: ‘that seems to us a man; we say this rather when our sensation is indistinct; in which case it may be true or false. discerned by touch. § 65. We can consider the mode of these activities; and from this point of view we can distinguish, underlying these activities, three powers of the soul: the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual. When we sense any sensible object we affirm that it is such and such; but when we imagine anything we make no such affirmation, we merely state that such and such seems or appears to us. past—or things to come, it should include the notion of time past or future; and in this way its combination will refer to past or future. For what cause each of these facts is so we shall say later on. But the actuality of sound involves the medium and the faculty of hearing. First, then, he says that the mind as a motive-principle is the mind in so far as it reasons for some purpose other than mere reasoning; in other words, it is the practical reason, which differs from the speculative by a different finality; for while the latter regards truth for its own sake and nothing else, the practical reason relates its knowledge of truth to some deed to be done. Thus in the soul we find, first, a direct knowing, in that it looks directly at its object; and then the circular return by which the intellect reflects upon itself. The intellectual soul is, we have said, only in potency to its ideas at first. Then at ‘Now I call that’, he explains the members of the division, and first what he means by a special sense-object. They thought therefore that if soul is by nature a cause of movement, it must be by its nature a moving essence. But an animal is such primarily by sensation. § 140. § 457. For there are two kinds of matter: sensible matter, which is intrinsic to physical things and from which the mathematician abstracts; and intelligible matter, intrinsic to mathematical entities. Then, at ‘Further, if there are not many’, Aristotle touches on the difficulties that arise concerning the soul’s potentialities. If, then, imagination is that by which we say that some phantasm arises within us, it follows (if we are not speaking metaphorically) that it is one of the faculties or dispositions in virtue of which we perceive and pronounce either falsely or truly. Then at ‘For when a man possessed of etc.’, he applies these distinctions to the present problem. § 546. § 710. Nor is the exterior sensible object nobler, strictly speaking, than the particular sense moved by it, though it is in a way nobler as having actually the white or sweet quality which the senses have only potentially; but of the two the sense is strictly the nobler thing, and this in virtue of sensitivity itself—hence in receiving the object immaterially it ennobles it, for things received take, as such, the mode of being of the receiver. He has not yet decided that there is any one common faculty that takes account of the activities of the particular senses. § 426. Hence he says here that the sensitive and opining, i.e. Hence, just as it can be shown, in the case of physical objects, that the intellect knowing their essences is other than the senses which know them in their individuality, so too, in the case of mathematics, it can be shown that what knows the essences, i.e. Now when air is disturbed it makes sound audible, provided that it is a single continuum such that a sound can be formed in it. The seventh argument, at ‘Again, that, etc.’, runs as follows. The following argument may make this point clear. ‘Sad’ comes in here because Empedocles wrote in verse. Now living beings taken all together form a certain class of being; hence in studying them the first thing to do is to consider what living things have in common, and afterwards what each has peculiar to itself. But if an object is not directly perceived by any special distinct sense it can never become the indirect object of any other sense through the concurrence of two senses or sensibles in the same thing; it must always, in every respect, be indirectly perceived. Inanimate bodies are brought into being and maintained by an exterior moving principle, whereas animate beings are generated by an intrinsic principle, i.e. For this reason [the lower] appetite is without deliberation. As we have said, it was Plato’s view that the specific forms and, principles of things were numbers; so when he came to treat of the soul he based its knowledge of things on its fundamentally numerical composition; all of its activities, he maintained, sprang from this source. novissima ad fidem optimarum editionum diligenter recognita et exacta commendataque a S.S. Leone PP. There is no difficulty, however, about admitting an indirect stellar influence upon intellect and will, in so far as these faculties act in conjunction with the faculties of sense. For the latter are, in a way, within the soul itself; hence the act of the intellect is interior and at will; whereas sensation is not from within the soul, and requires that a sense-object be presented. BOOK III, CHAPTER VI It follows that, inasmuch as food is the material of feeding, it is essentially, not accidentally, related to the besouled body as in potency to this body. But, by the same reasoning, there is no need to go beyond the first sense of all; there is no reason why sight should not sense its seeing. Hence, there the sound will be very distinctly heard. Then at ‘Odour is etc.’, he indicates the organ of smell, saying that as the basis of odour is dryness (as that of taste is moisture) the organ of smell must be in potency to odour and dryness (as that of sight is to colours and light). In the same way, animals that live in water are not aware that when two bodies touch one another their surfaces are wet; for, being habitually in water, they do not notice the water between them and the bodies they are touching. Wherefore, we must first decide what light is. If it was in the power of these arts to enter bodies or instruments they would not do so indiscriminately, but the art of playing the flute would enter flutes, and not lyres, while the art of playing stringed instruments would enter stringed instruments and not flutes. As to the essence, there is a double difficulty: first, as to how it ought to be defined, and then as to the elements of the definition (this point comes at ‘Perhaps the first thing needed’). § 705. Only the intellect knows truth and falsehood. And since all these are activities of the soul, and also types of movement, it would seem that the soul moves. For both hearing and sound can be regarded either as in act or as in potency; and what has been said of them in this connection is true also of the other senses and sensible objects, namely that, as the subject of both action and passion is not the agent but the thing that receives the action—the agent being only the source of the action—so the act of the sensible object, no less than the act of the sense-faculty, exists in the latter as in its subject. understanding, and so forth. § 208. But there must also be a conjoined instrument; for the food must be digested; and this requires heat. § 506. EMPEDOCLES, PLATO, SOUL AS SELF-MOVING NUMBER Note that he is defining in terms of the’cause of the thing defined; for voice is not in fact the striking itself, but a sound made by striking. the intellect, is distinct from what apprehends mathematical objects themselves, i.e. If it is the essence of the soul to move itself, to be in motion will not be in it incidentally, as in what is white or three cubits long; for these also participate in movement, but incidentally. For it is of the nature of food to maintain the substance of what is fed; which is required by the continuous using up of natural warmth and moisture. § 568. § 270. Whether the inward storing away of images should itself be called a movement or a resting is not immediately relevant. And the same is true of anything whose form exists in matter; there is something in it besides its specific principle. Thus in the work of seeking definitions we have to consider the objects of the soul’s operations before these operations themselves. Next, at ‘Therefore, do not also’, he shows that other sense-objects act on inanimate things, though not on all. We may note also that though this common principle is set in motion by the particular senses, all the impressions of which are transmitted to it as to their common term, this does not imply that the particular senses are nobler than the common sense; though certainly a mover or agent is, as such, nobler than what it moves or acts upon. Sensation is reliable as to whether a thing is white or not, but not as to whether it is this or that. Clearly, then, every act of the mind has an actual starting point and term. There is indeed no name for the quality in air and water which provides the medium for odour; but it certainly is not transparency. That such ‘spiritual’ modification of the medium is effected by the object of sight more than by that of the other senses is due to the fact that by their visible qualities corruptible bodies participate in the mode of being of incorruptible bodies; hence these qualities exist in a more formal and noble manner than do the other sense-objects which are proper to bodies precisely as corruptible. But on this, supposition it is obvious that there is no difference between saying, with Democritus, that the soul consists of small indivisible bodies and saying that it is composed of units in position. Therefore no single thing by itself can produce sound—the reason (or sign) of this being that the cause of sound is percussion, which implies a thing struck and a striker. He [Democritus], asserts that intellect and soul are absolutely identical; and that what appears is the truth. The latter begins at ‘And it seems that the sense-object’ [L.12 §765]. And this will be the middle term of the syllogism, of the practical reason issuing in a choice. The intellect is called ‘reason’ in so far as it comes to intelligible truths by a process of enquiry. 1 ad 11: “Ipsa verba doctoris audita, vel visa in scripto, hoc … Everything in Nature has a reason, exists to supply the needs of purposeful being. With regard to (1) he first shows the necessity of touch for all animals; and then, at ‘The others exist’, that the other senses are not found in all. Then, at ‘But an animal is such primarily’ he shows that a soul is the source of living in animals. It cannot, for instance, be mistaken when it simply knows what man is; on the other hand, just as sight can be deceived in respect of what is joined with its proper object, e.g. In outline, then, we have stated what nutriment is: the subject must be further examined later in a special discussion. Hence light is necessary if colour is to be seen. Now this saying would be false if every part of the soul had its bodily organ, for then the forms would be received into the composition of soul and body, not into the soul alone; for it is not sight that receives visible forms, but the eye. But the intellect has no special corporeal organ. So also smells might affect the air. § 567. It would seem then that the common objects themselves are incidental objects. § 850. in another, locomotion in another, and so on; as some indeed have thought. the subject of the accidents in question—as when one defines snubness as ‘curvature of the nose’. One and the same indivisible thing cannot be white and black at the same time in the same respect; nor, for the same reason, can it receive simultaneous impressions from white and black objects.

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